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Rising Governmental Use of Biometric Technology:
An Analysis of the United States Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program
Lisa Madelon Campbell†
Biometrics, when used to link an individual to a
particular event in time or place, may lend credence to
other information that may be available about an individual’s identity or activities. 5 The most elemental biometric measurements include hair and eye colour,
gender, and skin colour. Photographs will usually record
these forms of biometrics. Facial recognition technology
involves taking measurements of the contours of a
person’s face from different viewpoints, and comparing
these with images in an electronic database or an image
on an identity card. With facial thermography, the heat
patterns emanating from each person’s face are measured
from thousands of angles, creating a ‘‘heat’’ image. 6 Hand
geometry measures the hand and the spaces between
fingers to generate a dimensional record. 7 More sophisticated biometric information includes measurements of
hand geometry, fingerprints, deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) patterns, and eye iris scans. 8
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. . . the social consequences of new technological systems
will always be largely unforeseen and unintended . . .
Human destiny emerges as the unintended consequence of
invention. We are performing a grand experiment on ourselves in the complete absence of informed prior consent. 1

This article explores increased governmental
interest in the use of biometric measurements as a
means of identifying individuals and tracing their movements. Private industries, of course, are equally interested
in biometrics, and often similarly capable of collecting
and storing biometric information. For example,
merchants in the United Kingdom require customers
who pay by cheque to provide a thumbprint as an additional security measure against potential fraud. 2 The
issues raised by the use of biometrics in the private sector
are somewhat different than those that arise in the
public context. This article explores the increased reliance upon individual biometric measurements by governments in general and the United States of America in
particular, and analyzes the ensuing implications for the
privacy rights of individuals travelling to and living in
that country.

The Evolution of Biometrics

F

ingerprint technology was developed in the late
nineteenth century and is now widely used to verify
identification. Today, facial recognition systems used in
public areas such as walkways, airports, and sports arenas
will alert the monitors of the system when there is a
match between an individual’s face captured by the
camera and a database of photographs. 9

Biometric Measurements Defined

B

iometrics has been described as ‘‘the automatic
identification or verification of living human beings
based on behavioural or physiological characteristics’’. 3 It
involves taking or recording some of an individual’s most
inalienable biological parts and using these to identify
him or her. The information can be used in two ways:
(1) to verify that the person is who they say they are,
by comparing a previously stored biometric
measurement to a fresh measurement provided
by the individual, or
(2) to identify a person, by comparing their biometric measurement against a larger database of
stored measurements. 4

DNA analysis is currently the most precise biometric measurement possible; because of the finelytuned nature of the testing, however, it is also the most
prone to error. 10 Short tandem repeat (STR) DNA analysis is the method most commonly used in the forensic
science context. STR involves counting the number of
repeating sequences in a given DNA sample, and performing a statistical analysis of the probability that these
repeating sequences will appear elsewhere. 11 While this
method of DNA analysis is far more reliable than earlier
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methods, 12 errors may arise from animal contamination
or mixing with other human DNA. 13 The most reliable
samples come directly from blood and other bodily
fluids; however, DNA may be culled from discarded
facial tissues or from postal stamps that have been licked
by an individual. Essentially, human beings leave a trail
of genetic information wherever they go.
DNA databases help to assess the result of a match
between an individual’s DNA and DNA found somewhere else. 14 Recent technologies convert biometric
measurements into algorithms, which are then used for
matching. As is discussed above, the science of biometrics is based upon the statistical likelihood that two measurements are a match. Computer matching techniques
have an error rate that necessarily produces false positive
results, as well as false negative results. 15 This statistical
error rate is significant, because as we will see below, it is
one of several potential flaws in collections of biometric
information.

Practical and Theoretical Problems
in Biometric Applications
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iometric measurements tend to be treated as infallible; however, they are subject to error and they
tend to be most reliable when paired with other identifying information. Every reliable method of identification should have these features:
(1) it should measure a fixed and unalterable individual characteristic;
(2) that characteristic should be present in every
individual;
(3) that characteristic should be unique to every
individual; and
(4) that characteristic should be recordable, such
that it can be compared against others. 16

Many systems of biometric measurement do not yet
have common standards, so the tendency is to scan more
data rather than less, in order to later accommodate
specific data measurements. 17 As well, biometric measurements may not be designed to accommodate the
different forms in which individuals will present themselves. Differently-abled persons may confound biometric measurements; for example, someone with a
medical condition called pendular nystagmus, which
results in a constantly moving iris, cannot be irisscanned. 18 Unless they are able to take into account
every possible variant, biometric measurements will necessarily be flawed.
‘‘Outliers’’, or departures from the mean, must be
factored into every biometric system. For example, a
speaker recognition system based upon aural resonance
and designed using male subjects will not function in
the same way with female subjects, who have a shorter

aural resonance time-span. In addition to variations
among subjects, environmental factors must also be
taken into account. Facial recognition systems may fail if
lighting, position, or backgrounds are changed. An individual’s fingerprints are never completely identical, and
will vary significantly with changes in moisture and temperature. 19 Fingerprints from the same digit may vary
considerably due to differences in the pressure applied,
or whether there was something on the finger such as
moisture or another substance. 20 In an interesting intersect between science and technology, biometric measurement systems may fail when faced with a scientifically engineered body part such as a glass eye or
prosthetic hand. Identical twins have the same DNA
profiles, and persons in the same family may have DNA
that appears very similar.
The problems posed by these potential errors are
further compounded when biometric information is
compiled into databases, as is generally required in order
for it to be useful to governments and other entities. The
integrity of databases is essential to producing accurate
results, and this integrity may be adversely affected by
various factors, including samples from a single individual appearing more than once. For example, it is
important that the sampling methods be the same, and
that scientists analyzing the data receive the same
training and apply the same methods of analysis.
One major assumption underlying DNA databases
is that the DNA of the population from whom the samples were taken is sufficiently homogeneous that differences in a given strand of DNA may be interpreted as
statistically significant. 21 The scientific exploration of
human beings is far from complete. The human genome
was sequenced in its entirety in 2003, 22 and scientists
have a relatively good understanding of the chemical
composition of DNA. Little is known, however, about
the human genome’s highly complex structure and functions. 23
There are slight variations in alleles 24 among ethnic
groups, although with the increased movement of populations around the globe, it is anticipated that these will
decrease over time. 25 Blood relatives may have DNA that
is similar in appearance; thus, when one member of a
family is required to give a sample to a DNA databank,
the potential is there for identifying information about
several people to be included in the databank. 26 In fact,
at the genetic level, all homo sapiens are relatively homogeneous as a species, with more variation apparent
within small populations than between major racial
groups. 27 As researchers have observed, using genetic
information to categorize racial groups is fraught with
problems; they advocate for more work on the biological
and socio-cultural factors that link genetics to race and
ethnicity. 28

Rising Governmental Use of Biometric Technology

The Privacy Implications of the Use
of Biometric Measurements

I

f privacy is a continuum, and inviolability of the physical space in which one lives and travels is at one end,
then the other end, and perhaps the most sacrosanct, is
the inviolability of the self. This includes not only the
physical self, but the self as self-defined. When states use
biometric measurements to identify individuals, they are,
in a sense, pinning people to their biology. Biology is an
almost inescapable aspect of the self.
Most incursions into personal privacy are the result
of an exchange of some sort; an individual purchases fuel
in order to heat his or her residence, and this in turn
creates usage patterns that provide information about
him or her. Biological information results from simply
existing, and individuals cannot help creating it.
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Some view increases in surveillance by biological
and other means as dehumanizing, an invasion of personhood, and suggest that ‘‘total visibility infantilizes
people. It impoverishes their inner life and makes them
more vulnerable to oppression from without’’. 29 From
this perspective, people will recoil from certain activities
for fear that they will be traced, and if they do engage,
they do so in a circumscribed fashion, knowing that they
may be continuously monitored.
If, however, privacy is viewed as control over expressive information, an entirely new debate begins. 30 Each
use of peoples’ personal information can be gauged
against whether it encroaches upon that aspect of their
self, depending upon whether they have expressed themselves as a parent, a consumer, a voter, or a sexual
being. 31 This view is likely the preferable one, given that
in modern society, most people with access to it will use
technology to express themselves in a multitude of ways,
many of which can be recorded or traced.
The difference with biometrics, though, is that one
cannot help but exist, and by so doing, continuously
emanate expressive data. Perhaps even here, though,
technological change will outpace the capacity to trace
individuals by virtue of their biology. The co-discoverer
of the structure of DNA advocates for germline genetic
intervention in humans in order to possibly improve the
genome. 32 In the context of an application in the United
Kingdom to patent a process to genetically engineer
mammals so that pharmaceutical products may be produced in their milk, the applicant seeks the rights to
genetically engineered human females. 33
If individuals want to avoid giving off biological
information, they must actively intervene in order to
protect it, by covering faces so as not to be identified,
covering fingers or wiping surfaces so as not to leave
fingerprints, and retrieving tissues with possible DNA in
them. It is one thing for biometric measurements to be
taken for purposes to which an individual consents. The
collection of biometric measurements by governments
raises the problem that this information may be used in
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the future for purposes never contemplated by individuals when they first gave the information. That this
could happen is quite possible for two reasons:
(1) Function creep: the availability of databases containing biometric information makes them susceptible to other uses and of interest to other
entities. Insurance companies, for example, are
keenly interested in genetic data that may provide information about whether individuals are
likely to develop certain illnesses. Marketing
agencies are interested in people’s movements
and activities for purposes of designing advertising. Banks and other financial institutions are
interested in biometric information as a way of
adding further security to their transactions. An
important aspect of this is that certain biological
information may be mined extensively and
indefinitely: once a DNA sample is collected, it
may be retained and tested several times for
different purposes unless checks are put in place.
(2) Technological advances: given the rapid pace of
technological change, it may be impossible to
predict the types of information that may be
drawn from a given sample of DNA. While the
science of DNA has evolved in the past 20 years,
it is far from complete. The Human Genome
Project successfully sequenced the entire gene;
however, current DNA analysis uses only a fraction of the gene sequence. There are two important and emerging fields of scientific research
involving DNA:
(i) Genetic diseases — flaws in the genetic code
are now known to contribute to up to
4,000 hereditary diseases, such as cystic
fibrosis. Genetic mutations are also associated with predisposition to other illnesses,
such as cancer and diabetes.
(ii) Behaviour — genes appear to have some
influence on behaviour. Genes have been
found to influence sexual behaviour, thrillseeking, and violent tendencies. 34 While
not determinative, genes play a role, along
with the environment and other factors, in
how individuals conduct themselves.
An example of ‘‘function creep’’ exists in the United
States, where 20 states now allow law enforcement agencies to use collected DNA samples in research aimed at
improving forensic techniques. This research is partly
directed towards the controversial field of examining
genes for predictors of criminal behaviour. 35 While there
is some suggestion that DNA may play a role in predicting human behaviour, most scientists agree that an
approach that focuses solely on genetic indicia of behaviour is destined to fail, as it does not consider the essential interaction between genes and the environment:
Behavior flows from brains that (a) encounter specific environmental stimuli and (b) possess a neural architecture that
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is as importantly shaped by environments as it is by genes.
The essential point is that biological processes, properly
understood, provide no support for genetically deterministic
views of human behavior, whether they arise from political
motivations or from misconceptions. 36

It is unclear whether biometric measurements are
considered ‘‘data’’ for purposes of privacy legislation.
Danish authorities have decided that there is personal
information within human biological material; however,
a Norwegian tribunal held 37 that blood samples in a
hospital were not personal information within the
meaning of that country’s Personal Data Act of 2000. 38
Most privacy legislation was developed prior to the widespread use of biometrics as a method of identifying citizens, and before technological advancements in areas
such as DNA analysis. While many of the natural justice
principles underlying most privacy legislation would
apply to the collection and storage of biological data,
some principles, such as those governing the use of that
data, would not. Biometric measurements are subject to
uses that may be very different than those that would
apply to other types of information, including replicating
the biometric, testing it for genetic information, or
testing it against information found at a crime scene.
The European Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (the Convention) 39 has, since 1981, been
open for signature by any country as long as that country
ensures that its national legislation conforms with the
principles of the Convention. Of the natural justice principles underlying the Convention, one of the most significant is that data collected must be accurate, sufficient
for the purpose for which it was collected, and retained
only for as long as required. 40 The Convention allows for
the uninterrupted flow of personal information between
countries party to the Convention.
While not specifically addressing human biological
samples, the 1995 European Commission’s Directive on
data protection in defining ‘‘identifiability’’ provides that
it includes identification by reference to factors specific
to physical and physiological identity. 41 The Commission’s comments leading up to the finalization of the
directive show that it intended that the term ‘‘personal
data’’ be broadly interpreted to encompass fingerprints
and genetic characteristics. 42 The Project Group on Data
Protection, a consultative body composed of information
experts from the member countries, prepares reports on
biometrics. 43

Governmental Interest in Biometrics
To Track Individuals

S

tates have long used individual identifiers to enable
them to track the movements and whereabouts of
citizens. In the Roman Empire, soldiers, slaves, and citizens were identified by means of tiles; the South African
passbook was part of that country’s apartheid system. 44
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In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States
in September 2001, international and national government organizations enacted legislation and adopted
other measures aimed at combating terrorist acts, and
governments the world over have shown an unprecedented interest in collecting biological information
about individuals.
Of the 15 European Union member states, 11 have
national identification cards; in France, it is voluntary,
while in other countries, such as Greece and Spain, it is
compulsory for citizens to carry an identity card. 45 Thailand’s Central Population Database is populated with
information linked to a national identity card system.
The cards contain facial images, electronic fingerprints,
and other personal information, and are linked to an
electronic database to which most government agencies
have access. 46 There are many countries in which
national identity schemes do not exist formally, but
rather in a de facto sense. Initially developed as a permit
to allow individuals to drive vehicles, the drivers’ licence
in many countries has now become a form of identification used to facilitate a number of transactions unrelated
to driving. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Victoria describes drivers’ licences as a rich source of
personal information that is akin to a national identity
card. 47
The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1373 48 which, while failing to define terrorism,
requires member states to adopt a broad spectrum of
measures to combat terrorism. These measures include
the sharing of information and restrictions on the movements of terrorists. The UN Counter-Terrorism Committee monitors state compliance with the Resolution. 49
The European Union in 2002 adopted a Framework
Decision on Combating Terrorism 50 that contains a
broad definition of terrorist acts and requires member
states to legislate in compliance with the decision.
The International Civil Aviation Organization has
recommended facial recognition as a standard biometric
measurement that ought to be included in identity documents, and suggests that each country should be free to
add a second biometric of its choice. 51
Measures aimed at preventing terrorism in Germany empower the country’s Office for the Protection of
the Constitution and Federal Intelligence Service to track
non-citizens by means of a centralized database in which
individuals’ biometric measurements and other personal
information is stored. 52 Similarly, applying Britain’s 2001
anti-terrorism legislation, law enforcement authorities
may now search suspects without a warrant and collect
biometric measurements such as fingerprints. 53
Immigration officials in the United States, Canada,
and at the Israeli–Palestinian border currently use hand
geometry technology to identify travellers. 54 In a pilot
project between Canada, the United States, the Nether-
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lands, and Germany, travellers will be given a card that
contains their unique hand measurements.
Proposed U.S. legislation would require microchips
with biometric information to be implanted in state
driver’s licences, in order to render licences more secure
and less susceptible to forgery. Opponents characterize
the move as a shift towards a de facto national identity
card. 55 Social assistance recipients in some states in the
United States must provide their fingerprints, and fingerprints are included in driver’s licences in California. 56
Citizens of the United Kingdom are arguably the
most watched people on the planet. Being stopped by
law enforcement authorities in the United Kingdom
may mean having one’s fingerprints and DNA collected,
whether or not one is charged or even arrested. The
United Kingdom’s national DNA database contains the
genetic profiles of over two million people. 57
When biometric information is included in
national identity cards, governments may more easily
trace individuals’ movements within national borders.
The principal purpose of an identity card system is to
link an individual to a body of data. Identity checks
themselves generate data by creating information about
the location of an identifiable individual at a given time
and place. This in turn impacts upon privacy and further
reduces the possibility of remaining anonymous. 58
Several authors argue vehemently against the creation of national identity cards with biometric identifiers,
suggesting that individual privacy should not be sacrificed for measures that may or may not actually defeat
terrorism. 59 With all due respect to these commentators,
their arguments reveal a certain naı̈veté: identity cards
are here. As we have seen from the preceding discussion,
and will analyze in more detail below, identity cards are
comprised partly from information stored in electronic
databases, and partly from paper identification already
widely in use, such as driver’s licences and passports.

The Collection and Use of
Biometrics by the U.S. Government

I

t is important to consider the collection of biometric
information by the U.S. government both from
within and outside its national borders, because, as will
be discussed below, the government is using this information in an integrated manner.

The International Aspect
While there are over 300 air, land and sea ports of
entry to the United States, most travellers enter by
land. 60 Following the attacks in 2001, the United States
enacted various legislative measures aimed at countering
terrorism, including the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 61 (USA Patriot
Act), the Homeland Security Act, 62 and Enhanced Border
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Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 63 (EBSVERA). Provisions in the first and latter Acts required that biometric
identifiers be used in travel documents and that an automated entry and exit data system be developed that
would work in concert with other law enforcement and
national security databases. 64
Interestingly, U.S. officials call this capacity for interoperability, which links an entry-exit database to other
government databases and allows access by a vast array
of U.S. law enforcement agencies, ‘‘Chimera’’. 65 That
word, as used in Greek mythology, means a firebreathing monster, with a lion’s head, a goat’s body, and
a serpent’s tail; as used in biology, it means an organism
whose cells are not all derived from the same zygote. 66 As
is discussed below, it remains to be seen which of the
two descriptions is more apt.
Racial, ethnic, and national factors have played a
central role in law enforcement measures in the United
States since 2001. 67 That year, the United States
announced the launch of the National Security EntryExit Registration (NSEERS), a program requiring male
non-citizens over the age of 16, from certain countries, to
provide fingerprints and photographs upon entering the
country. 68 NSEERS targeted nationals of primarily
Arabic and Muslim countries, and was intended to apply
to most foreign visitors by 2005. 69 In 2003, nearly 82,000
male persons immigrating or visiting from predominantly Muslim countries were registered in NSEERS.
Their inclusion in NSEERS was based not upon citizenship but rather ethnicity — it was the country in which
they were born that was of interest to U.S. officials. 70
While the information contained in NSEERS appears to
have been used in approximately 13,000 deportations,
officials indicated that the system identified only 11 individuals as having links to terrorism. 71 Five of these 11
individuals were actually charged with a terrorist-related
offence. 72
NSEERS was intended to act in concert with the
Schengen Information System, the European Union’s
automated system containing personal information
about migrants and people who are suspected of having
committed or witnessed a crime. With over a million
entries, the Schengen system contains various types of
personal information, including individuals’ professions
and their sexual orientation. 73
Another electronic database in the United States,
entitled the Student Exchange Visitor Information
System (SEVIS), became fully operative in 2003 and
stores information on individual foreign students using
Internet-based technology. 74
Formed in 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is statutorily mandated to prevent and
respond to terrorism in the United States and reduce its
exposure to terrorism. Since its creation, the DHS has
been a central actor in various crime prevention initiatives that are arguably unrelated to terrorism as it is
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traditionally understood. Under a program called ‘‘Operation Predator’’, the DHS finds and assists in the prosecution of persons involved in child pornography. If those
individuals happen to be non-citizens, the DHS also
assists in their deportation. 75 DHS is a huge government
department, and includes the Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, the Science and Technology
Directorate, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation and Security Administration,
the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Citizenship and Immigration Service. 76 The Border and Transportation Security
Directorate alone employs over 20,000 people. 77
That same year, the Total Information Awareness
Program was developed within the Pentagon to
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. . . imagine, develop, apply, integrate, demonstrate and transition information technologies, components, and prototype
closed-loop information systems that will counter asymmetric threats by achieving total information awareness
useful for preemption, national security warning and
national security decision-making. 78

Also in 2003, DHS announced that a new program
called United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indication Technology System (US-VISIT) will integrate the
earlier NSEERS and SEVIS systems. Under the new
system, which is scheduled to be fully operational in
December of this year, when non-citizens enter the
United States through any of the air, sea, or land ports of
entry, they will be required to provide fingerprints and
photographs, and possibly submit to an iris scan. 79 Using
current procedures, once inspectors have scanned two
fingerprints and taken a digital photograph of the individual, they will enter the biometric information into a
database and compare it against other biometric information already stored there to determine whether there
is any information that would render the individual
inadmissible. When leaving the United States, non-citizens are required to have their travel documents
scanned, their photograph compared, and their fingerprints taken once again. When non-citizens leave the
United States, officials from DHS will authenticate identity again, using biometric information, and input the
details of the departure information into the database. 80
DHS officials have commented that they may collect additional biometric information when it becomes
possible to deploy technology that would allow for
this. 81 Information in the US-VISIT database is intended
to be used for general national security purposes, and
also to locate, and possibly deport, individuals in violation of their visas. 82 According to DHS, other countries
are participating in the implementation of US-VISIT, as
are U.S. local and state law enforcement agencies and the
U.S. departments of State, Transportation, Justice, and
Commerce, the General Services Administration, and the
Central Intelligence Agency. 83
Critics of US-VISIT question both the feasibility and
ultimate usefulness of the program. It has been suggested
that the intense focus on border security has resulted in
the insufficient allocation of resources towards enforce-
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ment of immigration laws within the United States,
including verifying whether individuals have overstayed
their visas. Concerns have been expressed regarding the
knowledge requirements and increased training needed
by immigration inspectors to operate and search the
various databases. 84
In a 2004 report to Congressional Committees, the
U.S. General Accounting Office examined the expenditure plan for the US-VISIT program and found that DHS
had not produced either an adequate privacy impact
assessment or cost-benefit analysis. 85 Significantly, the
report found that DHS had not implemented the usual
controls seen with the deployment of vast, costly technological systems, such as independent verification and validation. The report concluded that if these failings were
not addressed, their consequences would become even
more serious with increases in the size and complexity of
US-VISIT. 86
Most observers agree, however, that the viability of
US-VISIT will depend in large part on the integrity of
the various databases with which it will be integrated, as
well as its compatibility with those databases. For
example, the two fingerprint methods used under the
current program, while adequate for purposes of authenticating an individual’s identity, may not be enough to
identify a match in the 10-fingerprint system used by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 87 Also, while the USA
Patriot Act. 88 required the integration of the databases of
the former Immigration and Nationalization Services
department, the U.S. General Accounting Office criticized those disparate databases as being antiquated. 89
In a 2005 report on the implementation of the land
entry portion of the US-VISIT program, the Office of the
Inspector General, an auditing body, identified several
problems. Among these are the fact that in its initial
stages, US-VISIT captured less than 3% of those noncitizens who entered by land, and the exit aspect of the
program at land ports of entry is not finalized. 90
As well, under the manner in which US-VISIT currently operates, front-line immigration officers must
query several databases in order to perform the required
verifications. These databases, which contain information obtained by other federal agencies, commercial airlines, and sea carriers, include TIPOFF (a terrorist
lookout database), the Arrival Departure Information
System (ADIS), the Advance Passenger Information
System (APIS), the Biometric Verification System (BVS),
and the National Automated Immigration Lookout
System (NAILS), among others. These databases are supported by various technology systems, and are not currently integrated with US-VISIT. 91 As a result, the knowledge and training requirements for immigration officers
has increased, and the additional searches required often
cause significant delays at borders.
DHS expects it will take five to 10 years to transform US-VISIT into a comprehensive system for elec-
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tronically tracking foreign persons before they enter the
United States, at the point of entry, during their stay, and
when they leave. In June of 2004, DHS granted a contract worth US$10 billion to Accenture LLP, which has
agreed to act as the ‘‘prime integrator’’ and provide the
design, integration, and implementation of existing and
new systems. 92 By January 2005, DHS had processed
over 18 million people in US-VISIT, resulting in over
2,000 matches with law enforcement databases. Of these,
roughly half related to potential criminal activity and
half to immigration issues. 93
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The Domestic Aspect
As we have seen above, like many other countries,
the United States uses various biometric measurements,
such as fingerprints and facial recognition, increasingly
and in a routine manner in order to authenticate individuals’ identity. For obvious reasons, the collection by
the United States of individuals’ DNA has been the subject of much discussion. The debate over the compelled
production of DNA for inclusion in a databank crystallized recently in the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. Kincade. 94
In 1993, Thomas Kincade, a decorated Navy
Seaman who was experiencing worsening personal and
financial difficulties, robbed a bank using a firearm. He
pled guilty and was sentenced to 97 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release. Following his release from prison in 2000, Kincade’s urine
samples tested positive for cocaine. At his request, the
Court ordered treatment in a residential drug treatment
program, which Kincade followed; after this he appeared
to be rehabilitated and to be getting on with his life.
One of the conditions of Kincade’s supervised
release, however, was to follow the instructions of his
probation officer. In March 2002, pursuant to the terms
of the U.S. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act (DNA
Act), 95 the probation officer asked Kincade to provide a
blood sample. The DNA Act requires individuals who
have been convicted of certain offences 96 and who are
incarcerated, on parole, or on supervised release to provide federal authorities with a tissue, blood, or other
bodily sample on which a DNA analysis can be performed. Like other analysts, the Federal Bureau of Investigation prefers DNA information from blood samples
because it is more reliable than that obtained from other
sources. Thus, the guidelines specify that a blood sample
be provided. 97
Kincade refused to provide a blood sample,
explaining that he preferred not to for personal reasons.
He consulted with his lawyer, and did not present for
the scheduled drawing of a blood sample. Kincade was
arrested and imprisoned for violating the terms of his
release. He filed suit against the U.S. Federal Government, alleging that the DNA Act violated the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, which guarantees against
unreasonable search and seizure. The first level of court

105
to hear his case ruled that Kincade’s refusal to provide a
blood sample was indeed a violation of the terms of his
release. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed this decision 2–1, concluding that
compelling production of a blood sample was a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that
the government must establish individualized suspicion
before being permitted to conduct such a search.
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit voted to withdraw the
panel’s decision and have the case re-heard by 11 judges.
In a close 6-5 ruling, the 11 judges ruled in favour of the
government, finding that:
In light of conditional releasees’ substantially diminished
expectations of privacy, the minimal intrusion occasioned
by blood sampling, and the overwhelming societal interests
so clearly furthered by the collection of DNA information
from convicted offenders, we must conclude that compulsory DNA profiling of qualified federal offenders is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 98

The dissenting judges voiced serious concerns, and
would have ruled that programmatic, suspicionless
searches were constitutionally unreasonable. They
observed that DNA information contained in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) has the potential to
reveal information about individuals’ genetic defects,
predisposition to diseases, and possibly sexual orientation: 99
When democratic values are lost, society often looks back,
too late, and says when did this happen — why didn’t we
understand before it was too late? Today’s decision marks
one of those turning points — a fatally unwise and unconstitutional surrender to the government of our liberty for
the sake of security, and, should the plurality theory ever
become law, the establishment of a doctrine that would
leave us without the legal tools to halt further abolition of
our privacy rights. The compulsory extraction of blood samples and the maintenance of permanent profiles of American citizens is, unfortunately, the beginning not the end. 100

The amicus brief filed by the Electronic Privacy
Information Center with leave of the Court, but without
consent of the parties, made the observation that the
collection of DNA samples in a relatively accessible
national database raises the prospect that the samples
may be used in the future for purposes other than those
for which they were collected. 101
Each of the 50 states in the United States has a
DNA databank and over half authorize law enforcement
agencies to retain DNA samples after profiling has been
completed. 102 Three states allow the collection of DNA
from persons who have merely been arrested for an
offence. 103 U.S. law enforcement officials have also
resorted to the use of what some call ‘‘genetic dragnets’’; 104 they approach the family, neighbours and
friends of the victim of a violent crime and ask for buccal
swabs. 105
In 1994, the federal government established CODIS,
through which law enforcement officials across the
United States may access DNA information collected
from local, state, and federal law enforcement agen-

106
cies. 106 The number of profiles in CODIS has grown
exponentially; in 2000, there were slightly more than
200,000 profiles, and four years later, there were over a
million and a half profiles. 107 CODIS lacks uniformity:
each state has differing technical standards and different
criteria as to which offences result in a DNA sample
being compelled from a convict. 108
CODIS information is referenced within the
National Criminal Information Center (NCIC), another
law enforcement database. NCIC is the largest database
of criminal history in the United States, with information about more than 52 million people. NCIC is referenced millions of times a day. Fields in NCIC indicate
whether a DNA sample from an individual is available,
and provides the CODIS file number. NCIC interfaces
with the US-VISIT program. 109

Conclusion and Recommendations
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t is clear from the above discussion that the U.S. government is compiling vast amounts of biometric
information, including genetic information, in electronic
and searchable form, primarily from certain ethnic
minorities. Described by some as a ‘‘new penology’’ that
has arisen in the United States since September 11, 2001,
current profiling is an attempt by the state to manage
risk based upon group ethnic characteristics. 110 Aside
from the unsettling prospect of a government openly
engaging in racist behaviour, this risk management
strategy appears to be based upon faulty assumptions,
given that persons who engage in terrorist activities often
operate using their own identity, an identity that up
until the point of the terrorist act, was not associated
with any criminal activity, 111 and, as was discussed above,
biometric information is not a predictor of human behaviour.
The arrest rate for African-Americans in the United
States is four times that of Caucasian-Americans, and
their incarceration rate is seven times higher. 112 One
author has observed that the collection of DNA samples
in this context will result in DNA being collected
predominantly from African-Americans, thus increasing
the disparity in conviction rates among the two

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

groups. 113 As well, so-called ‘‘junk DNA’’ was deliberately
chosen for inclusion in the CODIS databank because it
was originally thought not to contain information about
an individual’s physical or medical characteristics. It is
now known, however, that DNA samples derived by the
short tandem repeat technology that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation uses may provide information about an
individual’s race or gender, among other things. 114
While the National Institute of Standards and Technology, in its report to the U.S. Congress, concluded that
the collection of biometric information from non-citizens in the form of fingerprints and facial photographs
— as opposed to DNA — raised no serious privacy concerns, 115 it is unclear whether consideration has been
given to the impact upon privacy and legal rights that
the integration of the various databases may have.
Biometric measurements are increasingly prevalent
as a means of identifying and tracing individuals. In a
world in which technological developments make the
analysis of vast amounts of information at a rapid pace
possible, and in which governments concerned with
security issues seek to positively identify individuals, biometrics play an important role. Biometric measurements
have potential flaws, however, that must be taken into
account when designing the massive technological systems into which they will be fed. When relying upon the
results that those systems produce, it is essential to take
into account statistical error rates. This is particularly the
case when the results relied upon emanate from a combined database, where the original information was collected from varying systems, and using different criteria.
The significant potential privacy implications must
also be addressed. Existing privacy legislation and information-sharing agreements were in the main designed
prior to the advent of the widespread use of biometrics.
National legislation and information-sharing arrangements, as well as international agreements, must be revisited with a view to establishing protocols for the collection, use, and dissemination of biometric information in
a manner that protects, to the extent possible, the privacy
and integrity of the individual from whom it was originally taken.
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